Introduction
In the past decade scholars who analyze politicians' policy strategies have emphasized the strategic importance of valence dimensions of voters' evaluations of political parties and candidates. Valence dimensions, a term first coined by Stokes 1 (1963, 1992) , refer to dimensions "on which parties or leaders are differentiated not by what they advocate, but by the degree to which they are linked in the public's mind with conditions, goals, or symbols of which almost everyone approves or disapproves". 2 Valence dimensions include such factors as parties' and party leaders' images with respect to honesty, competence, charisma, and unity.
These dimensions contrast with position dimensions such as tax policy, foreign policy, and debates over immigration controls and abortion policy, on which "parties or leaders are differentiated by their advocacy of alternative positions". 3 Many recent studies explore how the introduction of valence dimensions affects the positional strategies of office-or policyseeking politicians.
In a recent article in this journal, Adams and Merrill 5 develop a spatial model of multiparty elections in parliamentary democracies with proportional representation (PR), in which voters are motivated by both valence and positional issues, and where parties vary their policy promises in pursuit of policy objectives. Three central conclusions emerge from the Adams-Merrill paper: first, that a Nash equilibrium configuration of parties' positional strategies exists, given quite general assumptions about parties and voters; second, that for most realistic scenarios the parties can be expected to coalesce into rival blocs, with one bloc of parties presenting similar sets of leftist policies, and the other bloc presenting similar sets of right-wing positions; third, that parties will moderate their policies when their valence images deteriorate (and will shift to more radical policies when these images improve), an effect the authors label the centripetal valence effects result.
In this paper we generalize the Adams-Merrill model to elections where voters hold two or more parties collectively responsible for behavior or outcomes that reflect on these parties' valence images. An obvious example of collective responsibility involves a coalition of governing parties, whose valence-related images may jointly depend on voters' judgments about how skillfully the government is handling public concerns relating to the economy, crime, and foreign and domestic policy crises, as well as governing elites' reputations for honesty and unity. And, in certain situations voters may even assign collective responsibility to a set of opposition parties, particularly when these parties are widely viewed as a "protocoalition," i.e. a likely government at some future time. Of course, voters' tendencies to assign collective responsibility for valence-related performance, as opposed to singling out individual coalition members for special credit or blame, surely vary with the political context.
We extend the Adams-Merrill model to consider how collective responsibility affects parties' policy-seeking strategies, when they compete in a PR election in a parliamentary democracy. Specifically, we develop a collective responsibility model that allows us to vary the degree of collective responsibility that voters assign to coalitions of parties, so that we can analyze situations where voters assign nearly equal credit or blame for valence-related events to all coalition members, as well as situations where collective responsibility is attenuated. Our model can also accommodate elections that feature two or more coalitions of parties. We report Monte Carlo simulations and theoretical results based on our collective responsibility model, and we compare our results to those we obtain for the "basic" Adams-Merrill model, that does not incorporate collective responsibility. Our study produces five central findings.
First, we find that a unique Nash equilibrium in parties' policy-seeking strategies almost invariably exists under the collective responsibility model, just as it does for the Adams-Merrill basic model that does not incorporate collective responsibility.
Second, we find that the Adams-Merrill centripetal valence effects result, that parties moderate (radicalize) their policies when their valence images deteriorate (improve), also extends to the collective responsibility model.
Third, our computations suggest that the greater the degree of collective responsibility that voters assign to a coalition of parties, the stronger these parties' incentives to converge towards similar sets of policy positions -i.e. the more voters assign joint credit/blame to coalitions of parties for events that reflect on these parties' honesty and competence, the greater these parties' policy-seeking incentives to converge towards similar sets of policies. This result, which we label the coalition convergence effect, is relevant to remarkable research by Fortunato and Stevenson 6 , who report empirical findings that voters perceive that the policy positions of the governing parties in coalition governments converge significantly over time.
Our coalition convergence result suggests that voters' perceptions of policy convergence between coalition partners may enhance these governing parties' abilities to achieve their policy objectives. (Although as we discuss immediately below, voters' perceptions of collective responsibility hamper governing parties' policy-seeking objectives in other ways.)
Our coalition convergence result also implies that in situations where the party system in a PRbased parliamentary democracy is divided into two rival coalitions (as is arguably the case in Germany, Norway, and Denmark), collective responsibility motivates parties to coalesce into two spatial "clusters," with modest policy differentiation between the parties in each cluster.
Fourth, and related, we present theoretical and computational results that the coalition convergence effect is driven primarily by the strategic imperative for small, peripheral that parties' decisions to forgo formally joining governments whose policies they support may be due to these parties' desire to avoid sharing collective responsibility, which can hinder their policy objectives. 7 We note that the coalition convergence and the coalition penalty effects are reconciled as follows. Our theoretical results imply that parties that share collective responsibility face diminished prospects of achieving their policy objectives (the coalition penalty effect). Our results also imply that parties' best response to the strategic disadvantages associated with collective responsibility is to converge towards each other in the policy space (the coalition convergence effect). However, the computational results we report below suggest that while policy convergence between coalition partners partially mitigates the strategic disadvantages caused by collective responsibility, nevertheless in equilibrium these coalition partners' parties project that following the election the MPP dominates the policy-making process and that it is constrained to implement its pre-election policy position. Thus a party k's utility U k for an election outcome is equivalent to its utility for the policy position of the MPP. Defining as party k's utility for party j's policy position s j , where is assumed to be concave and to peak at , 13 it follows that k's utility for an election outcome is:
We note that our assumption that the MPP controls policy outputs contrasts with alternative models of policy-making in parliaments -both theoretical and empirical -which emphasize the policy primacy of the parties in the governing coalition 14 ; the central importance of the formateur, i.e., the party charged with forming the government 15 ; the dominance of the party with jurisdiction over the relevant government ministry 16 ; or a model in which all 13 We say that a function U is concave and peaks at if it is continuous, and if for all x in the domain of U for which ,
. Note that if U is concave and peaks at , then U is strictly increasing on the left of and strictly decreasing on the right, i.e., if , then and if 
Our distinction between the measured, long-term components of valence, V j , and the unmeasured, short-term valence components, j ε , plausibly captures the information environment party elites confront as they devise their election strategies. At the time that 21 Note that the identity of the MPP is not known to the voters at the time they cast their ballots because the vote share of each party is yet to be determined. members of the governing coalition, as will economic fluctuations prior to Election Day. 29, 30 However the example of the 2002 German election suggests that collective responsibility is not absolute -i.e., a coalition member's short-term valence image can improve (or deteriorate) 29 We emphasize that our assumption here is that coalition partners have theoretical reasons before the fact to project that their short-term valence images -i.e., the components of the voters' party utilities that are related to political events that occur between the time these parties select their policy strategies and Election Day -will turn out to be correlated after the fact because of short-term fluctuations in economic conditions, government scandals, etc., which simultaneously depress (enhance) voters' utilities for all members of the coalition. This assumption is not directly related to the current lively debate in the literature on government formation, over whether during the post-election period parties share unobserved attributes which render problematic the assumption of independent unobserved utilities associated with alternative governing coalitions (see, e.g., Garrett Glasgow, Matt Golder, and Sona N. However these effects are unknown -hence "unobserved" -by the parties at the point in the pre-election period when they select their policy strategies, and party elites may plausibly project that these unobserved components of voters' utilities for different coalition partners will turn out to be correlated on Election Day. 30 We note that coalition partners' long-term valence images also plausibly reflect their joint responsibility for valence-related effects that occur prior to the dates when they select their policy strategies for the upcoming election. However because we assume that parties' longterm valence images are known at the time they choose their policy strategies, parties' collective responsibility for past events that contribute to their long-term valence imageswhich party elites can assess at the time they select their policy strategies -does not complicate our analyses in the same way as joint responsibility for the short-term valence-related events that elites cannot anticipate at the time they select their strategies.
unexpectedly, for instance due to skillful or inept campaigning, without affecting its coalition partners' valence images.
To capture these effects, we employ a generalized extreme value distribution (GEV).
Using the GEV specification (the details of which are described in the Appendix), we can model situations where the error terms associated with parties' unmeasured, short-term, valence images are correlated with each other. Specifically, let the set K of parties be partitioned into n subsets, or coalitions, labeled , where demonstrates that the probability that the median voter prefers party is
where m denotes the median voter's position. We label the voting model described above the collective responsibility model. For this model, party k's expected policy utility U k is 
We label this special case the basic model.
Policy-Seeking Equilibrium in Parliamentary Elections: Simulation Results

Adams and Merrill
32 report two theoretical results on equilibrium for the basic model (where for all ): an equilibrium result, that a Nash equilibrium in parties' policy-seeking strategies must exist; and a centripetal valence effects (CVE) result, that a party has an incentive to unilaterally moderate its policy strategy when the measured component V of its valence image deteriorates (and to shift to more radical policies when this image improves). 34 The intuition behind the CVE result is that when a party's valence image deteriorates, which depresses its probability of being the median parliamentary party (MPP), it has incentives to moderate its policies -thereby shifting farther away from its sincere policy preference -in order to recoup some of its diminished electoral prospects. and increasing a somewhat depressed party dispersion). With respect to variations in the other model parameters used for our examples, we found that: 1) Results for linear loss utility for parties were similar to those for quadratic losses, but somewhat more dispersed; 2) Results for larger party systems (i.e., more than four parties) were somewhat more dispersed. Results for alternative sets of assumptions about the parties' valence images are reported below. 
(see column 2). The top row in the (note that higher values of denote greater degrees of collective responsibility). Table 1 reports results for fifteen additional scenarios (Scenarios 2A-2E, 3A-3E, and 4A-4E) -to be discussed below -in which we again vary the parties' long-term valence images and the degree of collective responsibility.
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The computations reported in Table 1 reveal four striking patterns. First, we located a unique Nash equilibrium in parties' policy-seeking strategies for every scenario that we investigated, which suggests that the Adams-Merrill equilibrium result, which applies to the special case where there is no collective responsibility, generalizes to the collective responsibility model that we investigate here. Second, note that the parties' optimal strategies at equilibrium are highly dispersed. Each party attempts to balance its policy preference with The third pattern in Table 1 
What accounts for the pattern that we observe in the numerical calculations, in which collective responsibility motivates the more radical governing party, Party A, to moderate its position, thereby converging towards its coalition partner, Party B? Party A's strategic logic revolves around the fact that when two (or more) coalition partners share collective responsibility, then these parties' probabilities of being the MPP are highly sensitive to each others' relative policy positions. This is because these coalition partners project that, to the 38 Note that this grouping into opposing blocs occurs despite the fact that in our illustrative examples, the parties' sincere policy preferences are evenly spaced along the Left-Right dimension.
extent that their short-term valence images fluctuate, these images will likely fluctuate in tandem because voters will ascribe joint responsibility to these parties for valence-related events or conditions. Therefore in the presence of collective responsibility, it is critical to a focal party's goal of becoming the MPP -which is necessary in order for this party to implement its announced policies -that the focal party be in a strong electoral position vis-à-vis its coalition partner(s) at the time that it announces its policy strategy. And, given that in the scenarios we investigate the more radical governing party A is at an electoral disadvantage vis-à-vis its coalition partner, Party B (in terms of these parties' relative likelihoods of winning the support of the median voter and thus becoming the MPP), this strategic imperative motivates Party A to moderate its position, thereby improving its electoral standing vis-à-vis Party B. 39 We label the strategic imperative for coalition partners to improve their electoral standing relative to each other the coalition convergence effect. In supplementary materials available on our website
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[J3] we support the interpretation offered above with the following theoretical result:
The peripheral governing party moderation theorem. Suppose that party K is a member of a coalition c f , that K's optimal position lies strictly between its sincere policy preference R K and the median voter position m, that this equilibrium position is to left (right) of all competing parties, and that K's equilibrium probability P(K) of being the MPP is smaller than the MPP probabilities of the other members of the coalition c f . Then if the collective responsibility 39 Readers may wonder why the strategic imperatives relating to collective responsibility delineated in this paragraph do not motivate Party B to significant moderate its policies, in order to improve its electoral standing vis-à-vis its coalition partner, Party A. The answer is that, first, Party A's optimal strategy s A * is similar to Party B's preferred position , so that B has little incentive to moderate its strategy s B * in order to improve its electoral standing vis-à-vis Party A. (By contrast, B's optimal strategy is spatially distant from A's preferred position , so that A has stronger incentives to improve its electoral standing vis-à-vis Party B.)
Second, in the examples we investigate here the governing Party B is already in a strong electoral position vis-à-vis Party A due to its greater proximity to the median voter position, and so experiences less strategic pressure to further moderate its position. In words, the theorem states that when a member of a governing coalition is a peripheral party, i.e., when it promises the most radical right-or left-wing policies of all the parties contesting the election, and when moreover this peripheral party's prospects of becoming the MPP are weaker than those of its coalition partner(s), then, as the degree of collective responsibility shared by the coalition members increases, this party experiences strategic pressure to moderate its policies. This result is relevant to the computations reported in Table 1 , where the left-most party A has a lower equilibrium probability of being the MPP than does its coalition partner, Party B, and where Party A's equilibrium position becomes increasingly moderate as the collective responsibility coefficient r AB increases.
We note that the peripheral governing party moderation result is relevant to many real world scenarios where small, noncentrist, parties -such as the German Greens and the French Communists[J5] -have entered into governing coalitions with large, mainstream, coalition partners (such as the German Social Democrats and the French Socialists). In these scenarios the peripheral governing party moderation theorem implies that the smaller, more radical, coalition member will experience pressure to moderate its policies by converging towards the position of its more centrist coalition partner.
The fourth pattern in Table 1 relates to how collective responsibility affects parties' probabilities of being the median parliamentary party (MPP). Note that as voters ascribe more collective responsibility to the governing parties A and B, these parties' equilibrium probabilities of being the of MPP decline (see the second column from the right in Table 1 ).
For instance, for the first scenario in Table 1 41 Note that the reduction in the governing parties' prospects of being MPP, as collective responsibility increases, occurs despite the fact that Party A significantly moderates its 3A-3E, and 4A-4E display similar patterns. And, these reductions in the leftist governing parties' prospects of being MPP, as a function of collective responsibility, imply an increased probability that one of the right-wing opposition parties (C or D) becomes the MPP. The effects of these probability changes are displayed in the RHS column of Table 1 , which reports the weighted policy outcome of the election, defined as the mean of the parties' equilibrium positions weighted by their equilibrium probabilities of being the MPP. We see that as voters ascribe more collective responsibility to the leftist governing parties A and B (i.e., as increases), this weighted policy mean shifts to the right, away from the governing parties' preferred positions. These results thereby suggest that collective responsibility depresses the responsible parties' prospects of being the MPP, which in turn damages their policy expectations. We label this the coalition penalty effect.
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Why does collective responsibility depress coalition partners' probabilities of becoming the MPP? The intuition is that when voters ascribe high degrees of collective responsibility to a coalition of parties, then, substantively, the voters view these parties as being interchangeable, in the sense that the coalition members no longer represent distinct alternatives to the voters. 42 Thus from the voters' perspectives, high degrees of collective responsibility effectively collapse the distinct alternatives that coalition members would otherwise represent into a single alternative -an effect that depresses the likelihood that the median voter will prefer some member of the coalition to all the parties outside the coalition.
AB equilibrium policies when collective responsibility is high. If A did not moderate its position in response to increases in r , its likelihood of being MPP would decline even more sharply. 42 This effect is analogous to that outlined in the famous "red bus/blue bus" example, that is often used to illustrate how unobserved similarities between different alternatives influence individuals' choice probabilities (see, e.g., Kenneth Train, Qualitative Choice Analysis, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1986) : If a commuter faces a choice between riding her car to work or taking a red bus, then if a new alternative -a blue bus -is added to the choice set, this can be expected to have little to no effect on the commuter's probability of choosing her car, because she will view the red and blue buses as interchangeable options. However adding the blue bus to the choice set depresses the probability that the commuter chooses the red bus.
Additional illustrative examples. Scenarios 2A-2E, 3A-3E, and 4A-4E in Table 1 ), then the probability that one of the governing parties (A or B) will be MPP is about 0.73. 44 Adams and Merrill, 'Policy-seeking Parties in a Parliamentary Democracy.' 45 The values imply that when all the parties are equidistant from the median voter's position (and ), then the probability that either B or C will be MPP is about 0.88. Extensions to alternative scenarios: Opposition "proto-coalitions" and centrist governing coalitions. Table 2 reports computations for scenarios that illustrate additional strategic implications of the collective responsibility model. Table 2A presents computations for situations where voters assign collective responsibility to the governing parties A and B and to the "proto-coalition" of opposition parties C and D. For both sets of scenarios illustrated in Table 2A -one where all parties have equal long-term valence images (scenarios 5A-5C) and one where the centrist parties B and C have stronger long-term valence images (scenarios 6A-6C) -we see that the coalition convergence effect operates for both the governing coalition and the opposition proto-coalition: namely, as collective responsibility increases, the peripheral parties A and D converge towards the positions of their coalition partners, as the peripheral governing party moderation theorem predicts. Indeed, when the collective responsibility coefficient is set to the high value
, there is minimal policy differentiation within each coalition (i.e., the coalition partners are separated by less than 0.2 units along the 1-7 LeftRight scale) but substantial policy variation between the coalitions, i.e., the policy distance between the coalitions is nearly 1.5 units on the 1-7 scale. These computations thereby illustrate how the strategic incentives associated with collective responsibility can transform a multiparty system into what is effectively a two-party system, in terms of the meaningful policy alternatives offered to the electorate. Table 2B reports computations for scenarios where the governing coalition now comprises the two centrist parties B and C. Again, we see that as the degree of collective responsibility increases, the coalition partners converge towards each other (the coalition convergence effect), and that collective responsibility again depresses the coalition partners' probabilities of being the MPP (the coalition penalty effect).
[ In toto, the computations reported in Tables 1-2 
Simulation analysis
To substantiate the conclusions suggested by our illustrative examples and the peripheral governing party moderation theorem, we simulated 1000 four-party elections in which parameters were chosen randomly from a parameter space, with the parties' probabilities of being the MPP given by equation 2 above. Parties A and B were assumed to be the governing parties, and the value of the collective responsibility coefficient was chosen from a uniform distribution on the interval [0.0, 0.9], while voters were assumed to ascribe no collective responsibility to the opposition parties C and D (i.e., For these simulations we located an equilibrium configuration for all but three 47 of the 1000 scenarios we generated, which again supports the hypothesis that the Adams-Merrill equilibrium existence result -which applies to the basic model -extends generally to the collective responsibility model that we analyze here. To assess uniqueness of the equilibrium in each scenario, we generated for each of the 1000 scenarios two sets of starting values, with each starting value for each party randomly generated on the continuous interval from 1 to 7.
In all but five 48 of the 1000 scenarios the two sets of starting values led to the same set of equilibrium configurations, strongly supporting the conclusion that the equilibria are in nearly all cases unique. Finally, the evidence is strong that the equilibria are generally global (not just local) because each party's equilibrium position was evaluated as optimal by calculating its utility while varying its location in steps of 0.001 over the entire scale from 1 to 7. Thus, overall, we have strong evidence that, for the collective responsibility model, unique Nash (global) equilibrium configurations virtually always exist for an extensive parameter space.
The parties' preferred positions and their optimal strategies were then normalized by taking the absolute distance from the median voter's position. Each party j's optimal strategies were regressed on seven independent variables: the party's preferred position R j ; the square of this position , the party's long-term valence image V j ; the degree of collective responsibility that voters assign to the governing parties, ; and the interaction terms
and , resulting in equations for the optimal strategy of party j of the form: ) (
47 All three aberrant scenarios occurred when the collective responsibility coefficient was high (above 0.8) and the valence of one coalition partner was very low relative to that of the other coalition partner, resulting in an extremely flat utility function for the low valence party and an unstable calculated optimal strategy for that party.
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48 In all five of the scenarios in which different starting values led to distinct computed strategies for a party, the parties' computed equilibrium positions for different starting points differed by less than .07 units along the 1-7 scale. In each of these five cases the value of was high and the valences of the coalition partners A and B were highly disparate.
Regression statistics are presented in Table 3 specifically, the left-most coalition member, Party A, has a lower mean MPP probability than the right-most party from outside the coalition, party D, while the moderate coalition party, Party B, has a lower mean MPP probability than the moderate party outside the coalition, Party C. As a result the mean weighted policy outcome over the simulations was 4.13, significantly to the right of the median voter position . This supports the proposition that collective responsibility diminishes the coalition parties' policy expectations -the coalition penalty effect that we identified earlier.
= m
Finally, we see that parties' optimal strategies are more moderate than their preferred positions (see the comparison between the parties' mean preferred positions and their mean optimal strategies, presented near the bottom of Table 3 ), most strikingly for the two extreme parties A and D, and especially for party A which is subject to the peripheral governing party moderation effect. This effect results in an equilibrium configuration in which the two parties on the left (and the two parties on the right) are much closer to each other than they are to the locations of the other coalition members. In fact, the gap between the mean optimal strategy for parties B and C is about twice the size of the gap between parties A and B or between parties C and D. Hence, the parties naturally coalesce into center-left and center-right coalitions, even though their preferred positions were drawn from equally-spaced intervals.
Conclusion and Discussion
Our computational and theoretical results suggest that introducing collective responsibility into a model of policy-seeking parties in a PR-based parliamentary democracy, generates interesting new insights into the nature of parties' policy strategies. On the one hand, our computations suggest that the two central theoretical results that Adams and Merrill ('Policy- seeking Parties in a Parliamentary Democracy') derive for a basic model -one that omits collective responsibility -extend to the collective responsibility model we present here: namely, we find numerically for a wide range of parameter values that a global (Nash) equilibrium in parties' policy-seeking strategies almost invariably exists and is unique, and, furthermore, that parties have incentives to moderate (radicalize) their policies when their long-term valence images improve (decline) -the centripetal valence effect result. On the other hand, we have identified three additional strategic incentives associated with collective responsibility: a coalition convergence effect, that jointly responsible parties have policy-seeking incentives to converge towards similar policy positions; a peripheral governing party moderation effect, that coalition convergence is primarily driven by smaller, more radical coalition members moderating their policies and thereby converging towards the positions of their larger, more mainstream, coalition partners; and a coalition penalty effect, that sharing joint responsibility for short-term, valence-related, events depresses coalition partners' policy expectations. This latter effect provides strategic incentives for political parties that approve of the government's policies to support the government from outside the coalition -as opposed to formally joining the coalition -in order to side-step collective responsibility for valence-related events that reflect on all the governing parties. Such incentives may contribute to the widely discussed phenomenon of minority governments, i.e., governing coalitions that control less than half the seats in parliament. 49 The hypothesized coalition penalty effect we identify raises an additional empirical question: If real world parties are policy-seeking, as we assume in our model, but parties suffer penalties in terms of their expected policy payoffs when they join a governing coalition, then why do parties ever choose to enter into coalitions as opposed to supporting a minority one-party government from outside the government? 53 With respect to this question, we suggest two promising lines for future investigation. The first is that real world party elites are largely unaware of the coalition penalty effect we identify, at least as it relates to the strategic disadvantages associated with collective responsibility. 54 Given that we have just developed the coalition penalty effect hypothesis -which we hope political scientists and politicians will view as a novel argument! -it seems plausible that party elites sometimes fail to project how the collective responsibility that comes with coalition membership can hamper their long-term policy objectives. A second possibility -one that applies particularly to smaller parties that have limited histories of participating in government -is that these parties' elites project that coalition membership will burnish the party's image with respect to voters' perceptions of the party's 52 We thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this point. 53 We thank Hugh Ward for drawing our attention to this issue. 54 We note that party elites are surely aware of the so-called "penalty of governance", whereby governing parties' vote shares typically decline over time (see, e.g., Martin Paldam, 'How Democratic leader Nick Clegg's belief that formal participation in government -the party's first such participation during the postwar period -would convince the British public that the Liberal Democrats could be trusted to govern the country, a perception that might strengthen the party's appeal in subsequent elections. 55 This suggests that we might extend our model to incorporate projected changes in parties' valence images relating to formal government participation. These considerations notwithstanding, we believe the coalition penalty effect we identify offers a promising explanation for the phenomenon of minority government, which has long puzzled political scientists.
From a theoretical standpoint, our conclusions on how collective responsibility affects parties' policy-seeking strategies is relevant to work by Adams, on how collective responsibility affects parties' vote-seeking strategies -which is to our knowledge the only previous study that incorporates collective responsibility into the spatial modeling framework. 56 In contrast to our conclusion that policy-seeking parties tend to converge towards each other's positions when they 57 The central intuition underlying Adams's result is that when two governing parties, say parties A and B for instance, share collective responsibility for valence-related events, then if they converge to similar policy positions they will tend to split the votes of the same group of supporters -i.e., most voters who prefer Party A to the rival parties C and D will also prefer Party B to parties C and D. Thus in this example the collectively responsible parties A and B
have electoral incentives to diverge in the policy space, so as to draw support from different voting constituencies. However, when A and B are policy-seeking this strategic incentive no longer applies, because policy-seeking parties cannot rationally announce policies that diverge phenomenon of collective responsibility is important for party strategies regardless of parties' mixtures of vote-seeking versus office-seeking motivations -but that the implications of collective responsibility differ depending on which goal is most salient to party elites.
too sharply from their sincere policy beliefs, at least in situations where they are obligated to fulfill their pre-election promises in the event they gain power, as we assume in our model. 
